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LABOR LAw-EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION IN THE FEDERAL PROCUREMENT SYS-
TEM-A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, cert. denied, 443 U.S.
915 (1979).
In November of 1978, President Carter signed Executive Order 120921
directing federal agency and department heads to incorporate in all con-
tracts for more than five million dollars a clause that requires contractors
to comply with the stated maximum wage and price standards. 2 Gener-
ally, 3 contractors that refuse to certify compliance will not be considered
for federal contracts. Those that certify but are later found in violation
may lose existing contracts and be declared ineligible for future ones.4
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions (AFL-CIO) and nine affiliate unions challenged the order in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They sought to
enjoin the order's enforcement on the grounds that it exceeded the scope
of the President's authority and interfered with their rights to bargain col-
lectively. 5 The district court granted the injunction in AFL--CIO v.
Kahn.6 The court concluded that the President had acted without statutory
or constitutional authority when he imposed wage and price guidelines
that included a debarment sanction for noncompliance on federal contrac-
tors. 7 The court rejected8 the government's contention 9 that the order was
I. Exec. Order No. 12092, 3 C.F.R. 249 (1978 Compilation).
2. Id. 44 Fed. Reg. 64276 (1979). See 102 LAB. REL. REP. (Analysis: News & Background Infor-
mation) 102 (1979) for an explanation of the current guidelines.
The five million dollar threshhold covers approximately 50% of all government procurement dol-
lars. It may, however, influence up to 70% because many companies bidding on contracts over five
million dollars also routinely bid on smaller contracts. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 92
(D.D.C. 1979). This dollar threshhold may be lowered at a later date. OFFP Policy Letter of Decem-
ber 27, 1978, 44 Fed. Reg. 1229-30 (1979).
3. 6 C.F.R. app. § 705 (1980) (lists numerous exceptions to the application of the standards).
4. OFPP Policy Letter of December 27, 1978, supra note 2. On the debarment sanction, see
generally, Gantt & Panzer, Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on Government Contracts and the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 5 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 89 (1963).
5. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The labor unions' argument that the
executive order's limits on wage increases interfered with their rights to bargain collectively was not
reached by the district court and was summarily dismissed by the court of appeals. Id. at 796. Al-
though the argument raises many questions, discussion of it is beyond the scope of this note.
6. 472 F. Supp. 88 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 3107 (1979), reh. denied, 100 S. Ct. 190 (1979). (Hereinafter references to the district court
opinion will give only the opinion cite and not the full subsequent history.)
7. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D.D.C. 1979). The provision of the debarment
sanction was crucial to the outcome. Without that sanction, compliance with the guidelines by federal
contractors would have been voluntary and the order would have been authorized by section 3 of
COWPSA. Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub. L. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750 (1974) (as
amended by Pub. L. 93-449, 88 Stat. 1367 (1974); Pub. L. 94-78, 89 Stat. 411 (1975); Pub. L.
95-121, 91 Stat. 1091 (1977); Pub. L. 96-10, 93 Stat. 23 (1979)). (Hereinafter, references to
COWPSA will cite to 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976) wherein the portions pertinent to this article are
codified).
8. The court found that COWPSA did not support the executive order because "[tihe Council's
function in combating inflation is . . . essentially horatory. Nowhere it is authorized to impose
sanctions." AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 94 (D.D.C. 1979). The FPASA failed to provide
sufficient authority because -[t]he law today simply does not support the argument that the procure-
ment power alone can be used by the President to control incomes." Id. at 98.
9. The executive order itself claims to be based on the two congressional acts. See note 1 supra.
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authorized by either section 205(a) of the Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA)IO or the Council on Wage and Price
Stability Act (COWPSA).II In addition, the district court found that the
guidelines were mandatory' 2 for federal contractors and, thus, prohibited
by section 3(b) 13 of COWPSA.
In the majority opinion by Chief Judge Wright, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed the lower court and found that the
FPASA granted the President authority to issue the order. 14 The majority
upheld the order because it found a "close nexus" between the FPASA
goals of economy and efficiency' 5 and the wage and price guidelines'
purported effect on procurement. 16 The court relied heavily on previous
cases that found the FPASA to be support for executive orders that im-
posed equal employment requirements on contractors. 17 The Kahn court
apparently reasoned that, if there was a sufficiently close nexus between
the FPASA and the equal employment orders, there was necessarily a
sufficiently close nexus between the FPASA and the executive order es-
tablishing wage and price standards. The majority concluded that the
wage and price guidelines are not mandatory and therefore do not violate
COWPSA, and that, in any event, COWPSA is irrelevant because the
order is authorized by the FPASA. 18
Courts have traditionally deferred to a President's interpretation of his
powers under a statute 19 and will only "reluctantly" overturn an interpre-
10. 40 U.S.C. §486(a) (1976).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976).
12. In finding the guidelines mandatory, the court explained: "[a] mandatory program is distin-
guished by the fact that failure to comply brings a penalty. One may ordinarily escape the effect of a
regulation aimed at controlling activity by ceasing the activity. But one who takes that course can
hardly be said to be acting voluntarily . . . . The program imposes a real penalty." AFL-CIO
v.Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 102 (D.D.C. 1979).
13. Section 3(b) of COWPSA reads: "Nothing in this Act . . . authorizes the continuation,
imposition, or reimposition of any mandatory economic controls with respect to prices, rents, wages,
salaries, corporate dividends, or any similar transfers." 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976).
14. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3107 (1979), rehi.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 190 (1979). (Hereinafter references to the court of appeals opinion will give only
the opinion cite and not the subsequent history.)
15. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
The goals of the FPASA are set out in the introductory section of the Act: "It is the intent of the
Congress in enacting this legislation to provide for the Government an economical and efficient sys-
tem for (a) the procurement and supply of personal property and nonpersonal services, including
related functions such as contracting ....... 40 U.S.C. § 471 (1976).
16. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 792. As Judge Robb noted, however: "[clarried to its
logical end that argument means that the executive's power to regulate industry and business is lim-
ited only by his judgment as to what will promote economy and efficiency in the government. " Id. at
818.
17. Id. at 789-92.
18. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 792-95 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
19. See FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976) (statute allowing the President to
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tation on the grounds that it is beyond the scope of power granted. 20
Kahn, however, allowed a disturbing expansion of Presidential policy-
making power through the procurement system. This note first explores
prior uses of the section 205(a) powers to support executive orders. Sec-
ond, it discusses flaws with analogizing from those orders to the wage and
price control order, and highlights the missing element of congressional
approval in this case. Lastly, it examines constitutional questions posed
by the decision. This note concludes that the court was mistaken in find-
ing a close nexus between the FPASA and President Carter's order. 21 In
its application of the close nexus test, the court abrogated the statutory
standards limiting executive discretion under the FPASA. The court's in-
terpretation of the Act delegates more power to the executive than the
Congress intended or had constitutional power to delegate.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the FPASA
The FPASA was a response to the "need for an improved and efficient
property management program" in the federal government. 22 Efficient
management of government acquisition, use, and disposal had been seri-
ously hampered by the lack of comprehensive legislation in the area and
the fragmentation of duties among various bureaus and agencies. 23 The
FPASA provided generally for uniform policies and methods of procure-
ment and supply.24 The Act contemplated that most procurement would
be done by advertising and public bid, although it allowed negotiation of
contracts under certain enumerated circumstances. 25 Contracts would or-
dinarily be granted to the responsible bidder whose bid was the most ad-
vantageous with respect to price, the bidder's experience, reputation, fi-
nancial resources, and other unspecified factors. 26
impose direct import controls such as quotas and also allowing indirect controls such as license fees
by implication); Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947) (statute im-
pliedly granting the President power to consolidate several agencies and appoint a new administra-
tor); J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1927) (statute authorizing the Presi-
dent to raise amount of duty imposed on imports).
20. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 102 (D.D.C. 1979). See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952).
21. See Note, 1980 DUKE L.J. 205 for suggestions on how a close nexus test would be limited
and applied to future Presidential actions under FPASA.
22. H.R. REP. No. 670, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprinted in (1949) U.S. CODE CoNo. SERVICE
1475.
23. Id. at 1476-77.
24. Id. at 1478.
25. 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1976).
26. 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1976). H.R. REP. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in
(1949) U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 1498-99.
719
Washington Law Review
To manage the new procurement system, Congress created the General
Services Administration. 27 Because the FPASA would affect all agencies
in the executive branch, the President was authorized to prescribe overall
policies. 28 Section 205(a) provided: "The President may prescribe such
policies and directives not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as
he shall deem necessary to effectuate the provisions of said Act, which
policies and directives shall govern the Administrator and executive agen-
cies in carrying out their respective functions hereunder.' '29 It was under
the claimed authority in this section that President Carter issued Execu-
tive Order 12092 imposing wage and price guidelines on federal contrac-
tors. 3
0
B. The Majority's Reasoning
The majority noted that neither the statute nor the legislative history
clearly defined the nature and scope of the President's policymaking au-
thority under section 205(a). To determine its scope, it therefore exam-
ined prior exercises of Presidential power based on the section. 31 In doing
so, the majority applied a familiar rule of statutory construction: when an
administrator has acted upon an interpretation of his power under a statute
for a considerable time, that interpretation is entitled to great weight. 32
The majority pointed to several examples of executive interpretation of
section 205(a): an executive order issued by President Johnson that pro-
hibited federal contractors from discriminating on the basis of age; 33 an
order by President Nixon that continued the exclusion of certain state
prisoners from federal contract work;34 and a series of orders beginning in
the 1930's that required equal employment action by federal contrac-
tors. 35 Relying most heavily on the equal employment orders, the major-
27. 40 U.S.C. § 751 (1976).
28. H.R. REP. No. 670, supra note 22, at 1491.
29. 40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (1976).
30. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1978 Compilation).
31. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
32. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (construing the fairness doc-
trine in the Federal Communications Act); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941) (affirming the
Secretary of Interior's power to designate lands for public grazing and to charge fees for their use. the
proceeds of which were repeatedly appropriated by Congress); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933) (upholding the hearing practices used by the Tariff Commission
pursuant to the statutory provision for a hearing).
33. Exec. Order No. 11141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301
Historical and Revision Notes, at 379 (1976).
34. Exec. Order No. 11755, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1971-75 Compilation) (1973).
35. President Franklin Roosevelt: see Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-43 Compila-
tion) (1941) (citing no specific statutory authority); Exec. Order No. 9001, 3 C.F.R. 1054 (1938-43
Compilation) (1941) (citing an act but not the FPASA); Exec. Order No. 9346. 3 C.F.R. 1280
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ity concluded that the President's interpretation of section 205(a) as al-
lowing broad authority to implement nonprocurement policies was
correct.36 Because section 205(a) supported the equal employment re-
quirements, its scope was found sufficiently broad to support wage and
price controls.
The majority then turned to the controlling goals of the FPASA, econ-
omy and efficiency. The majority stated that any order issued pursuant to
section 205(a) must promote these goals. 37 Because initial predictions es-
tablished that the wage and price controls would in the short run lower
costs of negotiated contracts, 38 and in the long run slow inflation, 39 the
court found a "close nexus" 40 between the order and the goal of econ-
omy.41
Finally, the court ruled that the order was not prohibited by section 3(b)
of COWPSA, which provides: "Nothing in this Act . . . authorizes the
continuation, imposition, or reimposition of any mandatory economic
controls with respect to prices, rents, wages, salaries, corporate divi-
dends, or any similar transfers." 42 The court found, first, that the execu-
tive order did not violate the COWPSA prohibition because compliance
was not mandatory. The debarment sanction was considered the with-
(1938-43 Compilation) (1943) (citing no specific statutory authority).
President Truman: see Exec. Order No. 9664, 3 C.F.R. 480 (1943-48 Compilation) (1945) (citing
no specific statutory authority); Exec. Order No. 10210, 3 C.F.R. 390 (1949-53 Compilation)
(1951) (citing an act but not the FPASA); Exec. Order 10308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1949-53 Compilation)
(1951) (citing an act but not the FPASA).
President Eisenhower. see Exec. Order No. 10479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-53 Compilation) (1953)
(citing no specific statutory authority); Exec. Order No. 10557, 3 C.F.R. 203 (1954-58 Compilation)
(1954) (citing no specific statutory authority).
President Kennedy: see Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-63 Compilation) (1961)
(citing no specific statutory authority); Exec. Order No. 1114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-63 Compilation)
(1963) (citing no specific statutory authority).
President Johnson: see Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Compilation) (1965) (cit-
ing no specific statutory authority).
36. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784,792 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
37. Id.
38. The majority reasoned that although the executive order might divert some contracts from the
low bidders who are not in compliance with the wage and price standards, this would not have a
significant effect in the "real-world setting." Id. at 792. "[Because] much Government procurement
takes place through the processes of negotiation . . .Executive Order 12092 will likely have the
direct and immediate effect of holding down the government's procurement costs." Id. This conclu-
sion was neither explained nor substantiated.
39. The majority explained that if many businesses complied with the guidelines, such compli-
ance would slow inflation and lower the government's costs. They relied on executive officials' re-
ports that most large companies intended to comply. Id. at 792-93.
40. The close nexus test appears to have been created, but not defined, by the Kahn majority.
41. Except for a cursory statement that the order was "in accord with the 'economy' and 'effi-
ciency' touchstone of the FPASA," the majority apparently ignored the 'efficiency' half of the
FPASA goals in applying its close nexus test. Id. at 793.
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976).
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drawal of a benefit, not the denial of a right. 43 The government, the court
stated, has the power to determine with whom it will deal and on what
grounds. 44 Second, the majority ruled that section 3(b) barred only those
controls issued under COWPSA. 45 The executive order imposed the con-
trols under the FPASA and it was, therefore, irrelevant that COWPSA did
not grant that authority.
Two dissenting opinions were filed. Judge MacKinnon's dissent fo-
cused primarily on the unsuitability of the FPASA as support for the or-
der, and concluded that if the statute did support the order, it lacked any
standard for the exercise of that delegated power and was probably an
unconstitutional delegation of that power. 46 Judge Robb's dissent, joined
in by Judge Wilkey, stressed the mandatory nature of the guidelines 47 and
43. The majority compared the government contracts to grants made to state and local govern-
ments that are conditioned on meeting certain requirements. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 794
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
44. The majority cited Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940) for this proposi-
tion. The fact that the government has the power to determine with whom it will deal, however, does
not support unilateral determination of similar matters by the President.
45. The majority quoted section 3(b): "[nlothing in this Act . . . authorizes . . . mandatory
economic controls." AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original).
The majority also pointed out that the executive order applied only to wages and prices, while section
3(b) barred controls with respect to "prices, rents, wages, salaries, corporate dividends, or any simi-
lar transfers;" implying that the section barred only controls that worked on all of the above.
46. Judge MacKinnon first discussed the lack of support for the President's interpretation of sec-
tion 205(a) in the FPASA's legislative history, and noted that EO 12092 was inconsistent with several
provisions of that Act. Id. at 799-803. He stated that the thin relationship required to uphold an order
issued under the FPASA rendered the President's power under that Act virtually unlimited. Such
power, he concluded, was far beyond Congress' intended delegation.
Second, Judge MacKinnon argued that COWPSA's section 3(b) prohibition of economic controls
indicated that Congress never intended section 205(a) of the FPASA to be used to establish wage and
price controls. He stated that the program was mandatory within the meaning of section 3(b) and thus
contrary to COWPSA. Judge MacKinnon also dismissed the majority's reliance on previous execu-
tive orders allegedly promulgated under section 205(a) as support for the wage and price control
order. Id. 809.
Third, he concluded that, if the FPASA as construed by the majority did support the wage and
price control order, it posed serious constitutional problems. "[A]ssuming that Congress did intend
to grant the President the power to impose mandatory wage and price standards on government con-
tractors, the terms it used to do so do not provide a constitutionally sufficient standard for delegating
legislative authority." Id. at 811. The majority, he stated, has ignored the principle that a statute
should be construed if at all possible to avoid constitutional difficulties. The close nexus test creates.
rather than avoids, constitutional problems.
47. "In my opinion . . . the guidelines are mandatory. Contractors who fail to comply are
threatened with the loss of contracts for the payment of millions, perhaps hundreds of millions of
dollars. No amount of sophisticated and metaphysical argument can convince me that compliance
under threat of such massive economic sanctions is voluntary." Id. 816-17. Judge Robb also found
that the section 205(a) powers were intended only to assure that uniform policies and methods would
be adopted by the various procurement agencies, not to allow non-procurement policies to be im-
posed on federal contractors. Id. at 817.
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Congress' intent expressed in COWPSA to forbid mandatory wage and
price guidelines. 48
II. ANALYSIS
A. Prior Executive Orders and the FPASA
The Kahn majority found support for its broad interpretation of the
President's authority under the FPASA in prior executive orders that im-
plemented nonprocurement policies. 49 Because the President's exercise
of power had been upheld in those instances, the majority concluded that
section 205(a) of the FPASA is a sufficient basis for upholding President
Carter's executive order imposing wage and price controls on federal con-
tractors. 50 This conclusion does not, however, necessarily follow. All the
prior executive orders were supported by existing congressional policy in
addition to the FPASA. 51 Affirmation of those executive orders, there-
fore, does not necessarily support the conclusion that the FPASA alone is
a sufficient basis for the President's implementaton of independent poli-
cies.
The majority acknowledged that the prior age discrimination order was
weak support for a broad interpretation of section 205(a). That order did
not specifically cite the FPASA, 52 and only three years later the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act provided clearer justification for it. 53
President Nixon's order excluding certain state prisoners from federal
contract work can be similarly discounted. The exclusion of state prison-
ers dates back to a 1905 executive order54 based on an 1887 statute that
barred federal prisoners from federal contract work. When 1965 amend-
ments to the 1887 statute relaxed the ban against the use of federal prison-
ers, President Nixon's order made the equivalent change in the treatment
48. -[I]t is a fair inference from this Act (COWPSA) that Congress believed that there was no
other statute which authorized the imposition of such controls by the Executive." Id. at 819.
49. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 789-92 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See notes 40, 43-45 and ac-
companying text supra. Nonprocurement as used here refers to those requirements imposed on fed-
eral contractors that work toward broader social goals such as equal employment. While achievement
of these goals may affect the cost or efficiency of government procurement in the future, their pri-
mary purpose is not procurement.
50. AFL-CIO v.Kahn, 618 F.2d 784,792 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
51. See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
52. Exec. Order No. 11141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301
note at 379-80 (1976).
53. "Although the Order can now be justified under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 . . . for the first three years of its operation this Order was apparently based only on the
FPASA." AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784,790 n.29.
54. Exec. Order No. 325A (1905).
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of state prisoners.55 Executive authority to act in this area was supported
by historical practice from which congressional approval could be in-
ferred, 56 as well as by the FPASA. It did not, therefore, support the Kahn
court's broad reading of section 205(a).
The majority placed greatest reliance on the equal employment orders.
These, it stated, were the most prominent use of the section 205(a) pow-
ers to date 57 and were supported by judicial decisions identifying the
FPASA as authority for the orders. Only two cases, 58 however, state that
FPASA is sufficient authority for the equal employment orders, 59 and in
both cases, the statements were dicta. 60 Not since 1967 has a case main-
tained that the President's authority under section 205(a) is by itself suffi-
cient to support the equal employment orders. 61
B. The Equal Employment Orders Analogy
The interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the administrator charged
with its administration is entitled to consideration from the courts and
should be accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the
law, particularly when the construction has been uniformly acted upon
over a long period of time. 62 The Kahn majority reasoned first that the
equal employment orders issued by various Presidents were the execu-
tive's interpretation of its power under the FPASA, and second that this
55. Exec. OrderNo. 11755, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1971-75 Compilation) (1976).
56. Cf., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 326 U.S. 459 (1914) (The President's practice of
withdrawing lands otherwise open to public sale when the sale would be against the public interest
was upheld. No statutory authority existed for this practice, but the Court found that congressional
acquiescence for approximately eighty years implied either congressional approval or that the prac-
tice was within the administrative powers of the President).
57. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 790. The majority failed to mention that none of the orders
cited the FPASA as authority.
58. Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3, 8 (3d Cir. 1964); Farkas v. Texas Instru-
ment, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1967).
59. United States v. New Orleans Public Serv. Inc., 553 F.2d 459,465 (5th Cir. 1977); Contrac-
tor's Ass'n. of Eastern Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 1971). Although cited as
basing the order solely on the FPASA, Farmer also relied on the declaration of policy by Congress in
section 2 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3. 8
(3d. Cir. 1964).
60. The language in both cases dealing with the validity of the executive order equal employment
program was merely an assumption by the court in order to reach the question whether the order gave
rise to a private right of action. Contractor's Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159.
167 (3d Cir. 1971).
61. Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1967) was the last case to
suggest that the equal employment orders were authorized by the FPASA alone. See, e.g., Contrac-
tor's Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942
(1978) (examples of cases after 1967).
62. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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interpretation included authority to issue a wage and price control order.
Therefore, it concluded, the wage and price control order is within the
scope of the President's power under section 205(a). 63 This conclusion is
flawed for several reasons.
1. Other Bases for the Equal Employment Orders
Neither the prior equal employment orders nor EO 11,246 currently in
force are clearly based on the section 205(a) authority. None of the orders
cited the FPASA as authority;64 only judicial decisions found any rela-
tionship between the orders and the Act. 65 Courts have referred to the
FPASA as possible authority for the executive orders mandating obser-
vance by federal contractors of equal employment standards. 66 Since the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, courts cite Title VII as
evidence of congressional approval of those orders. 67 In 1972, Congress
expressly approved the executive orders 68 and defeated a series of amend-
ments to Title VII that would have eliminated the equal employment pro-
gram.69 If those members opposed to the equal employment program had
thought that the FPASA, by itself, authorized the executive orders, they
would have also contemplated amendments to that Act.
The equal employment orders may, additionally, be grounded in an
implied constitutional requirement that federal contractors not discrimi-
nate on the basis of race. In Contractor's Association of Eastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Secretary of Labor, the court hinted at inherent presidential au-
63. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
64. See note 35 supra.
65. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
66. Id.
67. As adopted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(d) read: "Where
an employer is required by Executive Order 10925, issued March 6, 1961 (imposing affirmative
action requirements), or by any other Executive order prescribing fair employment practices for Gov-
ernment contractors and subcontractors . . . to file reports . . . the Commission shall not require
him to file additional reports ....... Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, §
709, 78 Stat. 262 (1964). The Contractor's Association court relied on this language to show that
Congress intended the executive order program to continue when it adopted Title VII. Contractor's
Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971). The Fifth Circuit cited this
section of Title VII as the "second source of legislative authorization" for the executive order pro-
gram. United States v. New Orleans Public Serv. Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977). The court
there also relied on congressional approval expressed during the debates on the Equal Employment
Act of 1972. Id.
68. "The two programs are addressed to the same basic mission-the elimination of discrimina-
tion in employment. The obligations imposed on the government contractor by the Executive Order
(11,246) . . . reinforce the obligations imposed by Title VII." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 15 (1971), reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2150.
69. E.g., 118 CoNG. REc. 1661, 1676 (1972) (rejecting an amendment proposed by Senator
Erwin to restrict the operation of Executive Order 11,246).
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thority under the Constitution for this purpose. 70 Using a broad
interpretation of "state action" it might be argued that the government
cannot constitutionally contract with employers who discriminate on the
basis of race because such behavior would be a denial of equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment. 71 It has also been argued that when the
government contracts for service it has traditionally performed itself, the
contractors should be held to the same employment standards as the gov-
ernment. 72 If these equal employment orders are authorized by either Ti-
tle VII or the Constitution, then the orders provide little support for the
Kahn court's broad interpretation of section 205(a) of the FPASA.
2. Equal Employment Orders and the Wage and Price Control Order
Even if the equal employment orders were examples of executive inter-
pretation of section 205(a) entitled to great weight in determining the
scope of that section, that interpretation would not clearly extend to au-
thorizing wage and price controls. One of the foremost justifications for
giving an administrative interpretation great weight is that Congress has
had notice of the interpretation and a chance to revise the statute if it
disagrees. If Congress has had notice that section 205(a) is interpreted to
allow the issuance of equal employment orders, it has had no notice the
section is also interpreted to allow wage and price control orders. Eco-
nomic controls have little to do with equal employment. Congressional
approval of the equal employment orders should not be extended to a
wage and price control order without an opportunity for Congress to re-
spond to this new interpretation of section 205(a) authority. 73 Moreover,
70. "We conclude, therefore, that unless the Philadelphia Plan is prohibited by some other con-
gressional enactment, its inclusion as a pre-condition for assistance was within the implied authority
of the President ....... Contractor's Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171
(3d Cir. 1971) (held, no congressional enactment prohibits the Philadelphia Plan; therefore, setting
minority hiring goals was within the implied authority of the President).
71. One author has suggested that "the government may not constitutionally contract with em-
ployers who discriminate on the basis of race, because such behavior would be 'state action' which
would make the government guilty of discrimination. The Executive Order (I 1,246) is thus valid
because it prevents this unlawful action from occurring." Comment, Executive Order 11,246: Presi-
dential Power to Regulate Employment Discrimination, 43 Mo. L. REV. 451, 479 (1978). Accord,
Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N. Y.U. L. REv. 225, 229 n.27 (1971).
72. The only question in applying such a theory here is how far the principle should be extended.
Comment, Achieving National Goals Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an Unconstrained
Administrative Process, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 301, 327.
73. The rule of construction relied upon by the majority requires that, in effect, Congress be
given notice of the administrator's interpretation of the scope of power properly available under the
statute. "[Tihe mere issuance of consecutive summary suspension orders, without concommitant
exegesis of the statutory authority for doing so, obviously lacks 'power to persuade' as to the exis-
tence of such authority." SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (paraphrasing from Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978)). The equal employment orders never
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the executive's mere claim that the equal employment orders are based on
section 205(a) of the FPASA is no basis for concluding that those orders,
or the wage and price control order, are lawfully based on that Act. 74
Administrative interpretations entitled to great weight are only those that
are within the policies and intent of the construed statute. 75 An adminis-
trator may not garner greater power than the statute grants by repeatedly
violating the limits of that statute. 76
Congress did not intend the FPASA to allow the President to make
sweeping changes in the direction of society or the economy; Congress
intended it to establish, organize, and coordinate the government's pro-
curement of goods and services. 77 On its face, section 205(a) has nothing
to do with either equal employment or wage and price controls. Undoubt-
edly, the drafters of the FPASA never contemplated that either policy
would be imposed on federal contractors through the procurement pro-
cess. Nonetheless, the equal employment orders were upheld at least par-
tially on the basis of FPASA. But in all instances since 1964,78 there was
also clear congressional approval of the policy the equal employment or-
ders represented. Title VII provided the authority for imposing equal em-
ployment requirements on federal contractors; the FPASA was a mere
mechanism for that imposition. As later cases construing the order recog-
stated that they were issued under the President's authority of section 205(a), and it is not clear that
Congress associated the orders with that statute. Furthermore, because section 205(a) has never be-
fore been used for a wage and price control requirement, Congress has had no ndtice of that interpre-
tation and the rule would not apply.
Congress did consider the procurement program in connection with its extension of COWPSA in
1979. It declined, however, to change any provisions of COWPSA in an effort to block the program.
"As was noted by Chairman Proxmire and other committee members, . .. the legal authority for
the Government to take so-called 'procurement sanctions' against companies failing to comply with
the guidelines is a matter to be decided by the courts." S. REP. No. 36, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13,
reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 955, 963. But see the minority views of Senators
Gan, Tower, Heinz, Armstrong, Kassebaum and Luger, S. REP. No. 36, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18,
reprinted in (1979) U.S. Coo CoNo. & AD. NEws 967 (arguing that the procurement program is
unlawful). Any changes made, of course, to COWPSA would have been ineffective given the court's
conclusion that COWPSA was irrelevant to the validity of the executive order.
74. But see Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964); Farkas v. Texas
Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
75. "[C]ourts are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative
decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional
policy underlying a statute." NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,291 (1965).
76. Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973) ("an
agency may not bootstrap itself into an area where it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly violating its
statutory mandate").
77. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
78. See note 59 and accompanying text supra. It is of little consequence here that prior to 1964
Congress had not affirmed the policy, however, because prior to that time no executive order cited the
FPASA and no case held that the FPASA granted the President the authority to act.
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nized, the FPASA alone would not have been sufficient. 79 In the absence
of a similar congressional policy supporting wage and price controls, the
FPASA should not be construed to provide the mechanism for imposing
these controls.
C. Congressional Disapproval of Wage and Price Controls
In Kahn, not only was there no affirmative congressional approval of
the wage and price control policy, but COWPSA expressly rejected man-
datory wage and price controls. The majority, however, found that
compliance with the wage and price controls was not mandatory. 80 Even
if the program was not "mandatory" within a restrictive definition of that
word, the wage and price control requirement nevertheless conflicted
with the broader framework of COWPSA. The Act sprang from a repeal
of the sweeping economic powers granted the executive by the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970.81 In contrast to the ESA, COWPSA provides
only for information gathering, publicity, and persuasion. 82 Mandatory
79. Id.
80. Both of the dissenting opinions and the District Court disagreed with this conclusion. See
notes 8, 14-15 and accompanying text supra. The majority's argument relied heavily on classifying
the debarment sanction as a withdrawal of a benefit and not the denial of a right. In using this compar-
ison, however, the majority confused the two different contexts in which government contracts, and
contractor compliance, occur.
In the context of grants or federal assistance programs, it is appropriate to speak of denial of a
contract for noncompliance with an executive order program as a withdrawal of a benefit, because the
entire transaction is based on the government's goodwill. The government receives nothing directly
in return. The Third Circuit recognized this distinction in Contractor's Association when it noted that
the Farkas and Farmer cases were not on point. These cases concerned a federal assistance program,
unlike Kahn which concerned direct government procurement. Contractor's Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v.
Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 1971).
Unlike grants, procurement contracts are two-sided exchanges of items of supposedly equal value.
Both Congress and the courts generally compare government contracting to its private counterpart.
See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940). In the private sector, however.
any conditions set by one party are usually bargained for and are offset by some advantage to the
other party, e.g., one party may be willing to pay more if the other will guarantee an early completion
date. By attaching a sanction to this wage and price control contract clause, the government has
removed it from bargaining. If nothing is offered in exchange for compliance, then compliance can
hardly be called voluntary; it would instead be evidence of unequal bargaining power between gov-
emnment and contractor. Alternatively, if it is inferred that something is offered in exchange such as a
higher price, then the wage and price control program is self-defeating. Compliance will result in
higher, not lower, prices to government.
81. "No economic authority is being granted or authorized .... It has been all too clearly
demonstrated by our own experience with economic controls that they are by nature arbitrary and
artificial, creating shortages and dislocation of resources ....... 120 CONG. REc. 28883 (1974)
(Remarks of Senator Tower urging adoption of COWPSA without amendment).
82. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976). "The council is first and foremost a forum-a forum which
draws representatives from all sectors of the economy to debate freely and air economic issues. It is a
forum to collect economic information and follow the direction of the various economic sectors. It is
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requirements do not comport with the Act's express provisions. Courts
have traditionally held that an executive or administrative order must not
defeat the provisions of the statute on which it is based,8 3 or defeat any
other clear indication of congressional intent. 84 Thus, the President may
not do indirectly under the FPASA what he cannot do directly under
COWPSA.
The majority in Kahn considered whether COWPSA prohibits wage
and price controls. After a brief discussion, however, it denied the Act's
relevance to the executive order and the FPASA.85 The court's conclu-
sion ignores the Third Circuit's analysis in Contractor's Association of
Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor.
The Third Circuit acknowledged that, if it found any other congressio-
nal enactment prohibiting the affirmative action plan required by EO 11 ,-
246, the executive order would not be within the implied authority of the
President.86 There the court found no statute in opposition, and indeed
found the above-mentioned signs of support in Title VII. The Kahn
court's dismissal of COWPSA ignored the analysis in Contractor's Asso-
ciation and the case relied on in that analysis: Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer.87
The Supreme Court in Youngstown considered the validity of an execu-
tive order issued by President Truman based upon his authority under the
Constitution and the laws of the United States. The order directed the
Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel mills and continue their opera-
tion because of a strike declared by the United Steelworkers of America.
After finding that neither the Constitution nor the general provisions of
the Defense Production Act authorized the order, the Court held that the
seizure was an unlawful exercise of legislative power by the executive. 88
In reaching this decision, the Youngstown court relied upon two consider-
ations important to the analysis in Kahn. The first consideration was the
history of specific congressional grants of power to the executive when
therefore a forum with oversight authority and not an operating agency." 120 CONG. REC. 28883
(1974).
83. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 barred SEC
practice of tacking 10 day trading suspension periods).
84. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1951). Justice Frank-
furter stated the proposition that it is impossible to find a grant of power in general legislation when
specific legislation denies that power. Id. at 609 (concurring opinion). Using Frankfurter's statement
as a model, the FPASA (general legislation) should not authorize imposing wage and price controls
when Congress, in COWPSA (specific legislation), explicitly refused to grant the executive that
power.
85. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
86. Contractor's Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971).
87. 343 U.S. 579 (1951).
88. Id. at 585.
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seizure of private concerns was contemplated; 89 the second was the recent
refusal of Congress to grant seizure power to the President under the Taft-
Hartley Act. 90
Exercises of executive power in the areas of both seizure and economic
controls have traditionally been based on specific congressional grants of
authority. 91 The exercise of executive power in both Youngstown and
Kahn, however, followed express congressional denials of the power. In
Youngstown, an amendment that would have granted the seizure power
was defeated by a large margin. 92 Similarly, in Kahn, specific statutory
language had been enacted to prohibit economic controls. 93 In this re-
spect, Kahn was an even stronger case than Youngstown for declaring the
President's order unlawful.
If the FPASA, in the absence of congressional approval of the policy
advanced, is an insufficient basis to support this order, then afortiori it is
insufficient when Congress has expressly disapproved the policy. Follow-
ing Justice Frankfurter's analysis in Youngstown, it is impossible to find
hidden in the general provisions of the FPASA a delegation of the power
Congress specifically withheld in COWPSA. 94
D. The Delegation Doctrine and the FPASA
The Kahn court's interpretation of the President's power under the
FPASA via the close nexus test is so broad that it may render that statute
an unconstitutionally broad delegation of legislative power. Under the
Constitution Congress has the power to define federal policy, and the ex-
89. Id. at 597-98
90. Id. at 586,600.
91. For a detailed history of congressional grants of seizure power, see Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 615-628 (1951). Economic controls have been imposed on three
occasions; World War II, the Korean War, and during the early 1970's. Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942, Pub. L. No. 402, §§ 2-51, 56 Stat. 23 (1942); Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L.
No. 774, §§ 401-410, 64 Stat. 798 (1950); Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 799 (1970).
For discussions of the first and third laws, see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944): and
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). See
generally Fleishman and Aufsas, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation. 40 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 25-30 (1976).
92. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1951) (93 CONG. REC.
3637-3645, 3935-3936).
93. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (COWPSA § 3(b), 12 U.S.C. §
1904 note (1976)).
94. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1951). "It is quite impossi-
ble . . . when Congress did specifically address itself to a problem, as Congress did to that of seiz-
ure, to find secreted in the interstices of other legislation the very grant of power Congress con-
sciously withheld. To find such authority so explicitly withheld is not merely to disregard in a
particular instance the clear will of Congress. It is to disrespect the whole legislative process and the
constitutional division of authority between President and Congress." Id.
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ecutive has the duty to carry it out.95 The delegation doctrine addresses
this division between Congress' legislative authority and the President's
executive authority. 96 By failing to circumscribe sufficiently the execu-
tive's authority under a particular statute, Congress delegates its own leg-
islative power. Such a delegation of legislative power violates the consti-
tutional separation of powers. 97 Traditionally, the delegation doctrine
served to invalidate overly broad statutory delegations of power to the
executive. 98 More recently, however, courts have avoided invalidating
statutes on this basis by narrowly construing the scope of power delegated
by the statute. 99 Although the delegation doctrine is rarely a restraint on
Congress, it retains vitality as a constitutional restraint on judicial inter-
pretations of statutory delegation of power. 100
To determine the scope of the President's power under the FPASA, the
Kahn majority looked for a close nexus between the Act's purpose and
the orders. Under the majority's new test FPASA authorizes any execu-
tive order that promotes 'economy and efficiency' in the government's
procurement of goods and services. The majority accepted at face value
the government's assertion that this program would result in economy and
efficiency. '0' Thus, the only limit on the executive's judgment is that the
court must determine that the order bears a close nexus to this congres-
sional goal. The problem with the majority's close nexus test is not the
closeness of the relationship that it requires to the goals of economy and
efficiency; rather it is the definition of the goal itself. The overall scheme
of the FPASA embodies a policy which is far more specific than the gen-
eral promotion of economy and efficiency. 102 By removing these ends
from the statutory means, the court interpreted the President's power to
be far broader than Congress intended. Executive action under the
FPASA is now permitted in areas, such as wage and price controls, in
which Congress provided no limits or standards. Where Congress pro-
95. See U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, 11.
96. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737
(D.D.C. 1971).
97. See, e.g., J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1927).
98. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
99. National Cable Television v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); Brannan v. Stark, 342
U.S. 451 (1951).
100. Judge Wright of the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, author of the majority opinion
in Kahn wrote in 1972: "at the risk of seeming antiquitarian, I think the reported demise of the
delegation doctrine is a bit premature." Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575,
582 (1972). He suggested that "[t]he courts should control discretion by vigorously reasserting their
inherent role as the interpreters of legislative enactments and guardians against invidious and irra-
tional exercises of governmental power." Id. at 581.
101. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 792-93 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
102. See notes 20, 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
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vides no "intelligible principle to which the person or body autho-
rized . . . is directed to conform," the statute is a forbidden delegation
of legislative power. 103 By finding a close nexus between the FPASA and
policies unrelated to the procurement's system's efficacy, the court abro-
gated the FPASA's "intelligible principle" and rendered the FPASA an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 104
III CONCLUSION
Neither the FPASA's legislative history, nor other past judicial uses of
that statute to uphold equal employment orders supports the holding of
the Court of Appeals that the FPASA grants the President authority to
issue the wage and price control order. The equal employment analogy
actually works against the result in Kahn by highlighting an element pre-
sent in those cases that is missing here: congressional approval of the pol-
icy. It is only the conclusory finding of a close nexus between the goals of
the FPASA and the executive order that establishes the FPASA as author-
ity for the order. It is the majority's same close nexus test that casts doubt
on the FPASA's constitutionality. A court should construe a statute to
avoid constitutional difficulties, not to create them. 105 If the close nexus
test causes such a statutory construction, and it appears that it does, it
should be abandoned.
Pam Mrkvicka
103. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1927).
104. This was one of the major points of Judge MacKinnon's dissent. He stated: "[I]f the presi-
dential procurement power in Section 205(a) were construed in a manner faithful to the purposes
underlying the 1949 Act no constitutional prescriptions would imperil the congressional scheme."
AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
105. See National Cable Television, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974).
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